




I recently had the privilege of participating in the federal judiciary's long-
range planning effort. Strikingly, one of the preeminent issues was whether
Congress should limit the size of the federal judiciary. The underlying question
was whether the quality of judicial decisionmaking is related to the size of the
judiciary. The debate suggested that decisionmaking, particularly at the
appellate level, involves more than judges simply voting their own views. Is
there any value in the interactions among judges that would be affected by
increasing the number of judges?
Our discussion sparked charges of elitism, political biases, and the like.
While those charges may to some degree be true, I believe that the debate was
a legitimate effort to focus the thoughts of federal judges on an important issue:
whether the quality of our decisionmaking would be adversely affected by
increasing the size of the judiciary.
The judiciary, like almost every segment of American society, has
increasingly fallen prey to the tyranny of statistics, often causing us to analyze
our work in unimaginative, piecework, and arithmetic ways. But the difference
between acting alone and acting in a collegial decisionmaking group cannot be
quantified. I do not pretend to have any sophisticated understanding of the
differences between decisions that are the product of individual deliberation and
those that result from group interaction. Nor do I pretend to be a biologist or
sociologist. But I suspect that both biology and sociology could help judges
consider the decisionmaking process. In the game parks in Africa, I have seen
the wisdom of animal species who consider together the best means for
collective protection and organization. The Constitution itself reflects the basic
view that we will reach some decisions better collectively, but that some
decisions must, by design, protect the minority and therefore be reached by
individuals without regard for majoritarian views.
Thus, the question recast is whether the judiciary-entrusted with
safeguarding the Constitution, protecting against the tyranny of the majority,
and vigilantly maintaining the separation of powers-suffers a dilution in the
quality of its decisionmaking when the number of judges increases.
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Alternatively, does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, which
clearly underlies Article m, dictate that each judge should act without regard to
the views of his or her colleagues, or, instead, should the mix of judges from
different backgrounds and appointed by different administrations and parties
qualitatively enhance the decisionmaking process through interaction? If judges
cast their votes independent of their colleagues' views, the number of judges
should never matter. But if the exchange of opinions and analyses is an
appropriate component of the decisionmaking process, size is very important
indeed; collegiality would be a value to be protected and preserved.
This essay focuses on appellate decisionmaking and examines the
judiciary's long-range planning discussions in that context. I confess directly
that I speak from my own experience on the Tenth Circuit; I concede the biases
that I have derived therefrom. I nevertheless believe that there is a value in
collegiality that affects the quality of judicial decisionmaking. This value
therefore suggests that merely adding judges may not always be the right
response to an expanding federal caseload. I urge that we go beyond the matrix
of computerized decisionmaking to consider the qualitative aspects of judicial
interaction in assessing the effect of our decisions on the lives and fortunes of
those coming before our courts.
II.
A principal topic of discussion at the federal judiciary's recent long-range
planning sessions has been whether the number of federal judges should be
limited to approximately one thousand. The federal judiciary is now composed
of 820 judges (including the unfilled vacancies).' Thus, the adoption of such a
proposal would mean the addition of very few more federal judges.2 Central to
the debate has been whether judicial collegiality enhances the quality of
appellate decisionmaking. My answer is an emphatic, "Yes."
It is easy to articulate the value of collegiality to the judges themselves, but
that, obviously, is not the final test. The true test is whether the existence of
collegial relationships among judges enhances the quality and efficiency of their
work and thereby serves the national interest. I believe that the experience of
the Tenth Circuit is proof of the importance of judicial collegiality and collegial
1 In addition to the nine Supreme Court justices, there are 179 appeals court judges, 28
U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and 632 district court judges, 28 U.S.C. § 133(a)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2 Compare Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough? Yes. More Would
Dilute the Quality, N.Y. TIms, May 17, 1993, at A17, with Stephen Reinhardt, Are 1,000





Before describing the impact of collegiality on an appellate court, I must
somehow define it. I come from an academic background, where collegiality
was at least a professed (if not practiced) value. Like Justice Stewart's
experience with obscenity, I know collegiality when I see it, and I have
experienced its failures where it was important in supporting professional
relationships. Most succinctly stated, collegiality on an appellate court is
knowing my fellow judges so well, and respecting their intellects and work
patterns so much, that I am willing to listen and consider carefully their
perspectives on each legal issue that we confront. It is a personal understanding
that transcends political backgrounds, personal idiosyncracies, and the natural
tendency to adhere unyieldingly to one's personal opinions.
The collegiality of which I speak, however, goes far beyond listening and
considering. It requires judges to leave their hard-learned styles of advocacy at
the door of the conference room. Collegial judges in conference are not
advocates of a position but students of an issue-comparing, contrasting, and
weighing each other's viewpoints and rationales. Often these deliberations do
not change a judge's vote or a case's outcome, but the rationale behind the vote
is more fully informed and intellectually sound because of the collegial
interaction. Of course, I cannot speak for other circuit courts or even for the
other judges on my court. But having seen the dynamic in conferences, on
administrative issues, and in the discussion of prevailing national issues, I am
convinced that it has enhanced the quality of our work.
It would trivialize the concept of collegiality to describe it as "getting along
with one's colleagues." Indeed, in some cases "getting along" is the antithesis
of collegiality. Collegiality is lively, tolerant, thoughtful debate; it is the open
and frank exchange of opinions; it is comfortable controversy; it is mutual
respect earned through vigorous exchange. In making the Supreme Court an en
banc body, I think the Framers saw that the strength of having several views on
a particular issue would outweigh the resulting inefficiency. The three-judge
panels of the federal courts of appeals and the occasional en banc consideration
continue to endorse that implicit rationale.
It would save significant time to have appeals decided by one judge. But,
in my view, the reliance on collegiality among appellate judges undergirds our
belief in the fairness of the appellate process and our confidence in fully
informed and thoughtful appellate decisions. Thus, those who condemn
collegiality as "the C word"-an elitist concept designed to preserve judges'
circle of association-misunderstand the meaning of collegiality on appellate
courts.
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Ii.
I have found the Tenth Circuit to be a model of collegial decisionmaking.
The characteristics I have just described exist among all of the judges on our
court. Such relationships, however, are developed only through conscious
efforts by each judge and the circuit as a whole. This process is neither simple
nor easy; federal judges are appointed precisely because of their independence.
They have demonstrated an ability to take strong and persuasive positions on
hundreds of issues, many of which involve issues now before them as judges.
For the most part, they were successful advocates answerable only to their
work or their clients. They were senior partners, presidents of bar associations,
tenured faculty members, and, above all, extremely confident lawyers. Thus,
for most appellate judges, the world of collegial decisionmaking is a very new
one. And holding such a group of thoroughbreds together as a functioning
collegial body requires the concerted dedication of each judge.
I am often asked why the Tenth Circuit perceives itself as a collegial court.
I can only respond with anecdotal evidence revealing the fostering of mutual
respect and admiration. Some of the examples I cite may seem trivial, but they
contribute to a style of interaction that adds incrementally to our knowledge of
each other and the understanding of our work.
The first and most important factor is that the judges know each other well
personally. We have visited each other's homes, become well-acquainted with
each other's spouses and children, and know each other's religious
backgrounds. We therefore enjoy the kind of personal relationships that allow
humor and empathy to flow freely. For instance, when one of the judges'
children suffered through a serious illness, the concern among the other judges
was palpable. The celebration of our children's weddings and the sharing of
our family experiences produces rich conversations after work in Denver. We
often even vacation together, providing us both with amusement and greater
insight into our colleagues.
I will always remember one evening in Denver when most of the judges sat
on the pillows at a Moroccan restaurant, eating from a common pot and sharing
our diverse religious views. It was an illuminating opportunity to test one's
own spiritual beliefs in the context of the challenging and thoughtful views of
others who had thought carefully about their own moral, ethical, and spiritual
dimensions. Developing this easy, comfortable tolerance and understanding
among very different and independent human beings is not easy. It requires
time and serious commitment. But each judge on our court is committed to
cultivating such relationships because of their importance to our substantive
work and our experience as judges. Most of us came into the appellate
judiciary, in part, for the intellectual stimulation of confronting difficult legal
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issues; that same intellectual stimulation derives in part from our close
relationships with each other.
Our day-to-day work on the Tenth Circuit relies on these relationships.
Because we are so dispersed geographically and meet face-to-face only once
every two months, it would be easy to retreat into our chambers, interacting
only at oral arguments or administrative meetings. But we have learned that
many of our minor differences in opinions, viewpoints, and methods of
operation can be resolved by a quick telephone call or computer message. If we
exchanged viewpoints only in our final written products (i.e., opinion drafts,
concurrences, and dissents), we would be far more fractious. Instead, it is a
rare day when I do not get a call from another judge suggesting language in a
proposed draft. All of these conversations reflect the intense respect that we
have developed for each other's viewpoints. While the result may not change,
frequently my concerns are thoughtfully addressed in the written product.
Inevitably, our easy relationships mean less friction, greater understanding, and
even less strident banter.
Collegiality also leads to a greater respect for each other's personal style. I
have learned to direct my concern to substance and worry less about form. For
instance, I tend to be a bit of a "schoolmarm" regarding grammar, punctuation,
and spelling. Thus, in my first months on the court, I wrote a letter to another
judge pointing out quite minor grammatical errors in a proposed opinion. I
soon received a phone call from a more senior judge, who, in a kind and
thoughtful way, suggested that it may be more effective to restrict formal
communications to the substantive issues of an opinion. In this sage advice, I
learned a rather obvious lesson: We are not very responsive to nit-picking, but
we respect substantive differences of opinion. Tenth Circuit judges therefore do
little "tinkering" with style and format, but we actively debate the substance
and merits of proposed opinions. In this way, we avoid the tendency to defend
our personal preferences and rely instead on the intellectual merits of our
positions. This approach may result in a few grammatical or punctuation errors
ending up in the Federal Reporter, but the benefits of this restraint far outweigh
the occasional errors in our product.
Our personal discussions about differing opinions occur so frequently that
judges often apologize for writing a concurrence or dissent before fleshing out
the differences by conversation. This may happen when a judge has been out of
town or when the difference of opinion is so difficult to explain orally that
mutual understanding will be better achieved through a written document. But,
importantly, these circumstances are the exception and not the rule.
Collegiality also requires judges to consider carefully the extent of their
involvement in cases on which they were not on the reviewing panel. Judges on
our court read every proposed opinion before it is issued; we place a high
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premium on consistency within the circuit. While each judges' practices differ,
we all attempt to read proposed opinions soon after they reach our desks. A
difficult question for us is when to express views about a proposed opinion in a
case on which we did not sit. I have found that, not surprisingly, judges
consistently reserve their nonpanel comments for issues that are important to
maintain consistency in circuit law or to guide district courts throughout the
circuit. Thus, the occasions on which a nonpanel judge will intervene in a
proposed opinion are limited and only go directly to issues that the entire court
should consider.
This procedure also allows the court to reach full court consensus before
the panel issues the opinion, sometimes saving the court from a formal en bane
hearing after the opinion has been issued. Formal en bane consideration is a
time-consuming and expensive process-waiting for a petition for rehearing,
polling the court for rehearing en bane, and affording full en bane review.
Where the issue is not so important, however, the intervention of a nonpanel
judge may complicate the panel consideration, exact a toll in relationships
among judges, and ultimately make little difference to the outcome. Thus, the
occasions on which a nonpanel judge will intervene prior to the issuing of a
panel opinion are infrequent.
IV.
I am always proud to read a concurrence or dissent written by a Tenth
Circuit judge; there is little, if any, strident or rancorous language. We all
recognize that the purpose of a dissent or concurrence is to illuminate more
fully the substantive merits of an issue. But, in my opinion, they should never
attempt to discredit the personal integrity or intellectual acumen of one's
colleagues. It is distressing to sometimes perceive the lack of such mutual
respect on other courts.
The importance of maintaining a high level of professional written
discourse is not in protecting judges' reputations but in protecting the integrity
of the system. Ours is a system of laws, not of people. In my view, judges bear
a heavy responsibility of demonstrating that judicial opinions are based upon
the judges' best efforts at analyzing precedent-the language of the
Constitution, statutes, and cases-and thorough legal analysis. Too often the
public seriously misunderstands the court system and the role of judges in the
decisionmaking process. To the extent that our writings attack the personalities
and abilities of each other, we contribute to this public misconception.
Another example of the Tenth Circuit's collegiality has been the judges'
extraordinary ability to adapt to new procedures and new ideas. Shortly after I
came on the bench, we faced a backlog of roughly three thousand cases. The
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Tenth Circuit took longer to dispose of cases than most courts of appeal.
Moreover, the court had several vacancies for an extended period of time. The
judges were discouraged and frustrated about the perceived hopelessness in
ever becoming caught up. At an informal retreat, I suggested judge-screening
procedures that would significantly increase judges' workloads and
substantially change the court's procedures. Rather than react with suspicion or
reticence, the judges not only considered the suggestion but adopted it with
remarkable speed. I have often reflected on that incident as an extraordinary
example of the mutual respect accorded each judge when he or she joins the
court. In fact, because the suggestion produced very satisfactory results for the
court, I have received far more credit than I deserve for my suggestion.
The value that we place on collegiality is largely a function of tradition.
Since the inception of the Tenth Circuit, judges have always socialized together
during terms of court in Denver. For example, the tradition of eating breakfast
together still persists for a number of the judges; it has only been diluted by a
few of us younger renegades who do not eat breakfast. Another example is the
nightly social hour in the chief judge's hotel room. The past few chief judges
have expended considerable efforts and personal resources (both in Denver and
at judicial conferences) to provide opportunities for the other judges to visit
outside of the context of work. The evening social hour is a valuable
opportunity to reflect on the events of the day and current issues for the court
or the nation generally, as well as to preserve personal friendships. They also
allow the Tenth Circuit judges to become acquainted with visiting or district
judges sitting by designation.
Each of the examples I have raised may seem trivial, but they are the
foundations of collegiality. The collective effect is to build qualitative
dimensions to the relationships between the judges. The collegiality of these
relationships, in turn, greatly enhances our decisionmaking process. For me,
this is one of the great strengths of the Tenth Circuit.
V.
This description of the Tenth Circuit is my way of defining the
characteristics of collegiality. One cannot express the value of collegiality
quantitatively or understand its importance except in context. When the federal
judiciary discussed limiting its size, a pervasive underlying question was
whether collegiality has any value separate from enhancing the
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experience of judges. I clearly believe that it does, and others share that view.3
It would be impossible to design consciously a system that would cultivate
collegiality for a court or for any other group. Rather, collegiality is a goal
whose characteristics are defined by those who pursue it in their interactions. It
takes different forms in every court because it is a function of the individuals
themselves and the history of the particular institution. Nevertheless, I suggest
to my colleagues around the country that the association of collegiality with
elitism and other negative characteristics fails to account adequately for the
important intangible qualities of collegial interaction among judges. To me, the
"C" word is critical in energizing and qualitatively improving the work of any
court.
3 See generally DANIEL J. MEADOR, MAuRicE ROSENBERG & PAUL D. CARRINGrON,
APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCrURES, FuNcrIoNs, PROCESSES, AND PERSoNNEL 547-90
(1994).
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